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We are writing the constitution of global economy 





This essay is a preliminary effort to assess the way in which the international economic 
order is being configured. It seeks to begin to understand the mechanisms through which global 
law in this field is being “produced.” The focus of my analysis will be guided by questions such 
as: Who are the most relevant actors in this process? How are these actors chosen? How do they 
operate? In view of the large scope of this topic, I have decided to study a specific incident that, 
in my view, helps to illustrate and focus a debate that—because of its global reach—seems to be 
excessively abstract.  
 
I. The Problem 
 
In recent times, the debate regarding the benefits and disadvantages of economic 
globalization has become an issue that not only experts are tackling, but that is also the object of 
heated disputes between politicians, trade unionists, non-governmental organizations, and the 
public in general. Among the many issues that have generated this debate, the role played by 
international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in the design of the institutional framework that accompanies 
globalization processes has been the object of special attention.  
There are two basic views regarding the assessment of the way in which the institutional 
architecture of economic globalization is being designed. On the one hand, there are those who 
celebrate the result and the mechanisms that have been implemented in recent years. An 
international network of academics, businessmen, and international officials belonging to the 
aforementioned international organizations holds this first view. On the other hand, an equally 
international network of people and groups sees with surprise how economic globalization 
processes have been detrimental to the ability of states—especially those less developed—to 
manage their economies with autonomy, in addition to promoting an irrational use of natural 
resources and contributing to the extinction of ancestral forms of cultural life (which, according 
to this view, are crushed under the homogenizing weight of globalization).   
Once the more relevant actors in the dispute have been identified, it is important to make 
clear the point that separates them. As we’ll see, at the foundation of the debate lies a dispute 
regarding the democratic legitimacy of those who are making the most important decisions in the 
design of the governance forms of the emerging new order. This is clear in the accusations made 
by the “anti-globalization band” (which includes ecologic groups, pro-indigenous rights groups, 
consumer groups, etc.) about the supposed “imposition” by economic international organizations 
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of global norms that privilege commercial interests over other values such as environmental 
protection or labor standards aimed at protecting workers. This accusation is categorically 
rejected by the official representatives of governments and by the heads of the international 
organizations that coordinate this kind of meetings. They defend their actions and argue that 
economic globalization is an undisputable good (ultimately—they argue—it will benefit 
humanity as a whole because it will promote an international division of labor that will bring 
about more productivity and, consequently, more economic development and a reduction of 
poverty) and that the international agreements attacked by the “anti-globalization sectors” are 
reached by the direct representatives of the participating countries, so the charge of “imposition” 
loses much of its bite. Moreover—they add—the people who attend international meetings, such 
as the successive GATT “rounds” that led to the WTO and the following meetings of this 
organization, are government representatives who, in their majority, have a democratic 
legitimacy, in contrast to the non-governmental organizations leading street protests, which only 
represent specific interest groups and not necessarily the national interests at stake, even if the 
causes they advocate are highly commendable.  
In light of these two radically different versions of the generation process of international 
commerce standards, it is important to assess if the critiques advanced by the anti-globalization 
groups are well founded. In this essay, I will particularly focus on the second set of objections 
raised by the anti-globalization sectors; that is to say, the “democratic deficit” affecting the 
design process of the normative structure accompanying economic globalization. In other words, 
I am interested in investigating the plausibility of the assertion that there is an “imposition” of 
international economic rules by the technocratic sectors leading the economies of the 
participating countries and the economic international organizations that support these processes. 
In the critics’ view these technocratic sectors would be making decisions in the name of millions 
of people who ultimately will be affected by these processes.  
In view of the extension of the problem I want to analyze and the difficulties inherent to 
this project (especially, if it is undertaken from a peripheral region as ours; that is to say, far 
away from the places where this type of processes happen), I have decided to study this problem 
through the analysis of an incident related to the production of the regulatory framework of 
global economy. The importance of this incident is made clear by the remarks of the former 
Director of the WTO that I have used as an opening epigraph for this essay, which were made on 
the occasion of the incident. The case I am referring to is the process whereby the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which is the international body composed 
by the most developed countries of the world,1 tried to promote the adoption of a worldwide 
agreement on the protection of foreign investment known as the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI). The MAI case is significant because it offers important keys to understanding 
the complex mechanisms that characterize these processes.     
 
II. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
 
                                                 
1 The member states are: United States, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Italy, Australia, Canada, 
Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Sweden, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Austria, 
Finland, Ireland, Iceland, Greece, Mexico, Turkey, Poland, Korea, Check Republic, and Hungary.   
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 In 1997, it became publicly known that the OECD was negotiating a multilateral 
agreement on foreign investment.2 The MAI is an attempt to establish legislation of global reach 
providing the basic regulatory structure for foreign investment. The drafters of this initiative 
deemed it to be a “necessary complement” to the rules of international trade.3 The aim of the 
MAI was to provide new investors’ rights and guarantees that should be respected by the nations 
receiving the investments. In the drafters’ view, the new rules will lead to a heightened role of 
foreign investment in international economy.  
 Among the provisions included in the draft of the MAI, there was a section concerning 
the protection of foreign investors against regulatory measures adopted by host countries causing 
economic losses. This clause, which established the prohibition of the so-called “regulatory 
takings,” 4 represented a radical change in the traditional concepts of the takings constitutional 
doctrines of all the countries belonging to the OECD. In fact, as we will see, the incorporation of 
such an extreme view regarding takings law is really surprising. To be sure, the clause required 
host countries to compensate foreign corporations negatively affected by state regulations 
enacted for the protection of the environment, public health, or labor security. In fact, my interest 
in this topic stemmed from the surprise of seeing in the draft of an agreement for the universal 
treatment of foreign investment a doctrinal position that has generally been rejected by the 
countries that drafted the agreement and that specialized literature often deems to be too extreme. 
This led me to take seriously the possibility that something strange could be happening in the 
decision-making process of the regulatory framework of global economy. If something strange 
wasn’t happening, how then was it possible that the OECD negotiators reached an agreement 
adopting a doctrine seen as extreme even in the United States, where the notion of “regulatory 
takings” originated?  
 My interest was heightened when I noticed that not only something strange was 
happening, but that the radicalism of the adopted provisions led this project to its complete 
                                                 
2 The negotiations leading to the MAI began in May 1995, when the OECD started its negotiations among 
representatives of the 29 members and a “group of experts” in international trade and investment. The writing of the 
draft was conducted in secret until 1997, when certain NGOs had access to a 145-page draft written by the 
negotiating team of the OECD. The NGOs denounced the content as a conspiracy of the rich nations and the 
international commercial community to “discuss in private the terms of a global constitution giving huge 
preeminence to the rights of the investors over the rights of developing countries in issues related to the 
environment, health, and security.” 
3 The MAI began to be drafted almost at the same time that the WTO started its role as the organization in charge of 
the application of the rules protecting international trade. The OECD experts that started the negotiations of a 
multilateral agreement on foreign investment had the view that the MAI was a “necessary complement” to global 
trade, insofar as the distinction between “trade” and “investment” was being blurred because of the globalization of 
the economy.  
4 The doctrine known as “regulatory takings” basically seeks to extend the logic of the doctrine on regular 
takings—which demands a compensation from the state when it takes private property; that is to say, when private 
ownership is transferred to the state—to cases in which the governmental regulation of the use of property has an 
adverse impact on private property. (A good discussion on the debate on “regulatory takings” may be found in Sax, 
1964; Sax, 1971; Michelman, 1971 & 1988; Epstein, 1985; Siegan, 1980; Petersen, 1989; Fischel, 1996; and Coyle, 
1993).  
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failure.5 To be sure, a consumer protection organization with an anti-globalization stance timely 
detected the project and led a campaign that was ultimately fatal for this initiative.6  
 The rise and fall of the MAI therefore provides an interesting starting point to 
understanding how multilateral corporate interests, the discourse of the experts, and the 
international networks of NGOs combine in the complex world surrounding the making of 
international economic law.  
 The structure of this essay is the following: I will first briefly analyze the relationship 
between economic globalization and law. Then, I will describe the drafting process of the MAI 
and I will analyze its takings clauses in order to support the argument that these clauses 
represented a radical innovation in the treatment of the relationship between state-regulation of 
the economy and private property rights. Finally, I will briefly reflect upon the challenges posed 
by current processes of global production of law to governance and the possibility of democracy.  
 
III. Globalization and Law 
 
 In recent years, the relationship between globalization and public policies has been the 
object of important academic attention (Reinecke, 1998). People who are interested in this topic 
usually study the limitations implied by economic interdependency for the domestic design of 
public policies, especially monetary, fiscal, and labor policies (Bauman, 1999; Gray, 1998; Held, 
1995).7 In spite of the ongoing debate concerning the extent and irreversibility of economic 
globalization processes and their contribution to the welfare of individuals (Kagan, 1998), few 
people dispute the fact that economic globalization has constrained the possibilities of action for 
the domestic design of public policies (Baker, Epstein & Pollin, 1998; Rodrik, 1996).  
 An important aspect of globalization is law, insofar as public policies are often expressed 
in legal norms. In any case, it is usually understood that law plays a merely accessory role in 
these processes. This perspective, therefore, sees the globalization of law as a simple 
consequence of economic globalization (Shapiro, 1994). According to this view, the rise of an 
increasingly interdependent worldwide economy might have triggered the development of global 
laws. The argument goes on to assert that the revolutionary developments in communication and 
transportation technologies and the possibilities they created for a global production and 
exchange of goods and services would be the ultimate cause for the globalization of law. This 
view, however, is incomplete. Although the best communication technologies and the 
availability of better and cheaper transportation have indeed been necessary conditions for the 
globalization of the economy, they haven’t been sufficient conditions to create a global economy 
that necessarily demands a set of rules operating as its structural background. In effect, just as 
                                                 
5 The MAI failed because an American NGO discovered the existence of the draft. A generalized rejection followed, 
leading the Council of Ministers of the OECD to announce that it will begin a “period of evaluation and 
consultation” before presenting the draft to the member states for their discussion. A couple of months later, in 
December 1988, the OECD finally stopped the negotiations of a multilateral agreement on investments.  
6 The organization I am referring to is the American NGO “Public Citizen” related to Ralph Nader, a well-known 
defender of consumer rights in the United States. It is worth noting that this incident signaled the first occasion in 
which an international coalition of NGOs was successful in blocking an international trade agreement of this 
dimension.  
7 Among these academics, Bauman’s view on the limits imposed by globalization on domestic public policies is the 
most radical. In his view: “The authorities of the states are not even pretending to be able or willing to guarantee 
social and economic security to those in their charge; politicians of all tendencies have made clear that in view of the 
restrictions imposed by competition, efficiency, and flexibility we can’t allow us anymore to have collective 
networks of security.” Zygmunt Bauman, In Search of Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 40.  
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law was an important precondition for the development of domestic markets (North, 1990; 
Williamson, 1985), it has also played an essential role in the development of global markets. 
Instead of being considered a mere consequence of economic globalization, global law, 
therefore, must be recognized as one of its facilitating elements.    
 The “constitutive” view of law in the introduction of economic globalization is against 
the common and mistaken notion that globalization is a self-propelled, inexorable, and probably 
irreversible tendency generated by forces that, in most cases, are beyond human control 
(Giddens, 1999).8 In contrast, I believe that the development of a global economy is far from 
being irreversible and that it is not the outcome of some sort of natural evolution. Instead, it 
requires a conscious updating of a structural background of laws and regulations (Gray, 1998). 
This view of the problem—stemming from the contributions made by Karl Polanyi to economic 
history a half-century ago—is worthy to be taken into account in times when the inexorability of 
free market global economy has become a common place for many politicians, public 
policymakers, and academics. In fact, production and global consumption are now possible 
thanks to the contributions of a set of legal institutions created in the last decades. These 
institutions, combined with high development levels of information technologies and 
improvements in the field of communications, paved the way for the development of an incipient 
global market.  
 
IV. The Demand of Transnational Corporations for an International Structure of Direct 
Foreign Investment (DFI) 
 
 In the last decades, transnational industries of developed countries have been relocating a 
growing number of their production processes in developing countries that offer lower labor 
costs and less regulated business environments. In addition to the relocation of production 
processes (“outsourcing”), foreign involvement in industries such as mining, forestry, and fishing 
has reached high levels that have led Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) to become an important 
factor in the economic future of almost all developing countries.9 Many people who highlight the 
advantages of international trade and investment have celebrated this fact: it will result in the 
creation of a global division of labor, thereby promoting the productivity of all participating 
countries.10  
 Another element that contributed to higher levels of DFI was the liberalization of trade as 
such. In effect, the fall of import tariffs and other tariff barriers to trade—a result of four decades 
of GATT negotiations—substantially contributed to the impressive growth of international trade 
                                                 
8 Just as the classic representation of the operation of markets is the “invisible hand,” globalization would be—from 
this point of view—the result of invisible forces beyond human control.  
9 However, the rise in the amount of foreign investment has led to important objections regarding the growing gap 
between poor and rich nations. This gap is produced by a system where foreign companies raise their profits by 
paying low salaries to the workers of “host” countries. Others are concerned with the negative impact on the 
environment produced by growing international trade and investment. In a similar fashion, an awareness has been 
growing in recent years regarding the dangers of undertaking a “race to the bottom;” that is to say, an offer of worst 
and worst environmental, health, and labor security standards, which are the product of the competition between 
poor countries to attract foreign investment through the reduction of those social regulations that have a negative 
impact on the business environment. In a parallel way, there are also those who pay less attention to the risks of 
economic globalization, arguing that in spite of all the discourses against globalization almost all countries still have 
quite autonomous economies. In fact, they show us that even in a country as globalized as the United State, the 
imports and exports only represent about 12% of the total of the economic product.  
10 See Reinicke. 
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by the end of the 1990s. Global competition was consequently accelerated. In this scenario, more 
and more companies and industries of OECD countries were forced to consider the relocation of 
part of its manufacturing production to places with lower labor costs and more lenient 
environmental standards. The argument is that if corporations of richer countries have the same 
opportunity to produce the majority of their products in the same place and under the same 
conditions of their counterparts in the Third World, then they will be able both to reduce their 
production costs and face the challenges of international competition more satisfactorily. A freer 
trade regime thus made DFI in developing countries more attractive for OECD countries.  
 Once the aforementioned technological and political changes led companies of OECD 
countries to relocate their production processes in other nations, these companies eventually used 
law to ask for more security and predictability because productive investments—in contrast to 
short-term capital investments—take a long time. In addition, the huge amounts of capital 
invested in mining industry, for example, which only produce profits after several years, led 
foreign investors to put pressure on the host countries to provide higher guarantees. The need for 
such guarantees arises from the fact that any change in the “rules of the game” that regulate 
repatriations of profits, labor regulations, environmental standards, etc. represents a threat to 
these economic interests as real as an unexpected change in the prices of goods or a general 
economic crisis. However, the difference between this type of fortuitous events and the legal 
structures governing the rules of foreign investment is that in the latter case it is possible to adopt 
measures aimed at increasing the degree of predictability. To achieve this goal it is necessary that 
the new rules become entrenched in the system through legal norms almost impossible to modify 
such as constitutions or international agreements.   
 The most important concern of OECD countries investors in developing countries had 
historically been the possibility of takings or the “nationalization” of their assets. With these 
experiences in mind (really traumatic for those who experienced them11), foreign investors of the 
developed world investing in developing countries have demanded the existence of constitutional 
clauses guaranteeing property rights that would protect them against takings without 
compensation and the enforcement of these clauses by impartial and independent courts.  
 In the last two decades, however, the risk of “pure and simple” takings has considerably 
diminished, both because the economic thought of developing world political elites now deems 
“nationalization” to be an inefficient measure from the economic point of view and because 
current economic circumstances are forcing developing countries to actively seek for foreign 
investment (and nationalizations would negatively affect the reception of foreign capital, which 
would be deterred because of previous cases of nationalized foreign companies). 
 Although more benign for foreign investment, this new scenario still poses risks for 
multinational corporations that invest in developing countries. To be sure, there is still a subtler 
mechanism whereby foreign investors may be partially “expropriated” through governmental 
regulations aimed at reducing the profits of foreign companies. American specialists have 
dubbed this phenomenon “regulatory takings.”  
 With this more sophisticated form of taking in mind, the expert OECD negotiators 
included in the draft of the MAI a provision stipulating the duty of host governments to 
                                                 
11 The so-called “nationalizations” of foreign industries began in the mid-twentieth century and consisted in state 
authorities taking control of private industries without paying any compensation to their owners or making deferred 
payments that, in practice, caused huge losses to the former owners. Some of the cases of this phenomenon were the 
nationalization of American oil companies by the Mexican government in the 1940s and the nationalization of 
American copper companies by Chilean authorities in the period from 1967 to 1972.   
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compensate foreign investors whenever governmental regulations would lead to “regulatory 
takings.” 
 
V. Property Rights and “Regulatory Takings” 
 
 The concept of regulatory taking refers to the expropriation effects of measures aimed at 
regulating private property. Whereas a traditional government confiscation physically deprives 
the owner of her ownership, a regulatory taking is a de facto expropriation through a regulation 
that substantially reduces or eliminates the value of property. An example of a regulatory taking 
that is often mentioned is the case of land-use regulation that prohibits the development of some 
piece of land in order to protect the environment. This type of regulation may lead to a 
substantial reduction of the economic value of property. Those who support this view argue that 
in this type of situations law should treat the regulation as the functional equivalent of 
confiscation. This argument, however, has often been opposed with the view that, since the rise 
of modern constitutionalism, the obligation to compensate for government takings is just 
applicable to confiscations and open takings; that is to say, in cases where public authorities 
physically deprived an owner of her property.  
 In 1922, however, the Supreme Court of the United States held for the first time—in 
Justice Holmes’ words—that “if the regulation goes too far” it might become a taking of private 
property that must be compensated.12 After the New Deal, however, American courts almost 
abandoned this doctrine and left the decision to compensate those who had been affected by a 
regulation to the discretion of federal and state legislatures. In fact, these courts almost never 
ruled that the regulation at stake had gone “too far” to require the compensation of the owners of 
the property negatively affected by the regulation.13  
 In spite of the oblivion that covered regulatory takings after the New Deal, since the 
beginning of the 1980s and the Reagan years this doctrine became the object of much attention in 
legal and political debates thanks to aggressive campaigns to revive the old “regulatory takings” 
doctrine launched by neo-liberal academics14 and pro-market organizations such as the Pacific 
Legal Foundation.15 These efforts led to two decisions in which the Supreme Court seemed to be 
                                                 
12 The case Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), involved a suit of a mining company against the 
constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting the extraction of coal from the soil of urban areas for public security 
reasons.  
13 See Robert Meltz, Dwight H. Merriam & Richard M. Frank, The Takings Issue: Constitutional Limits on Land 
Use Control and Environmental Regulation (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1999). In addition to the United States, 
other countries have also had to deal with the problem of regulatory takings. For example, the 1980 Chilean 
Constitution established a strong constitutional protection of property rights, including the duty to compensate in 
case of regulatory takings. Another interesting case is Canada, which rejected the introduction of the right to private 
property in its Bill of Rights because of the fear that the new “judicial review” power of the Supreme Court could 
lead to the preeminence of economic rights over the decisions of democratically elected governmental bodies. 
Similarly, European countries don’t have a protection of property rights against “regulatory takings.” 
14 The set of academic defenses of the constitutional and philosophical value of demanding compensation from the 
government in case its regulations of the uses of property have a negative impact on the value of property was 
initiated by Siegan (1980), and then Epstein (1985), Paul (1987), Macedo (1987), Fischel (1996), among others.  
15 The Pacific Legal Foundation is a non-profit organization located in Sacramento, California, that advocates for the 
defense of property rights. Since the beginning of the 1980s, this foundation has been involved in the support, 
financing, and legal advise to owners affected by environmental protection, health, labor security, and rent control 
regulations.  
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modifying its half-century-old doctrine on these matters.16 Despite these decisions—which 
seemed to suggest that the Court will begin to supervise the expropriation effects of the 
governmental regulation of property—the reintroduction of administrative takings to American 
constitutional law never really happened. Defenders of property rights were therefore convinced 
that it was necessary to amend the US Constitution in order to obligate the government to 
compensate whenever property-use regulations would substantially reduce the economic value of 
property. The opportunity for this amendment came in 1994 when the Republicans introduced in 
Congress their “Contract With America,” which included a provision regarding regulatory 
takings. This provision forced the government to compensate when its regulations reduced in 
70% or more the previous value of the affected property. When the “Contract With America” 
failed, the defenders of property rights kept waiting for the Supreme Court to overrule its 
doctrine supporting governmental regulation of the uses of private property.17 
 The political context supporting the concept of regulatory takings may be illustrated by 
an editorial note of a Chilean newspaper—known for its defense of neo-liberal thought—that 
reveals what is at stake for those who support this concept. El Mercurio, a newspaper from 
Santiago, Chile, published in 1993 the following editorial note relating to the threats to private 
property in the post-cold war world: 
 
“… In our days, the risk to free market posed by Socialism is not in the ghost of 
takings—for state control of the means of production has lost its popularity 
everywhere in the world—but in the control of private companies through 
regulation. In short, Socialism now wants to control private property through the 
less criticized notion of regulation because it can’t anymore deprive owners of the 
property over their assets.” 18 
 
 Those who advocate the protection of property rights from the political process through 
the constitutionalization of a right to private property have used different logics in their 
arguments. Some of them defend the supremacy of private property over democratic decisions 
with the argument that property is a “natural” and pre-political right granted by God or reason to 
humanity (Locke, 1975; Nozick, 1974; Epstein, 1985). Theories that see property as a natural 
right defend its constitutional protection against threats posed by democratic decisions. Others 
don’t view property as a natural right, but they accept the need to constitutionally protect 
property based on utilitarian arguments. There are also others who—in spite of viewing private 
property as a natural right—oppose the constitutionalization of property because this strategy 
might be counterproductive (Span, 1998).  
 On the other side of the debate on the nature of property rights and their constitutional 
status, there is a set of theories that attack the notion of a preeminence of property rights over 
democratic governance. For some people, the right to private property is fundamentally different 
to other civil and political rights such as free speech or the right not to be tortured. Instead of 
being a natural and pre-political right, the right to property is deemed to be a conventional 
                                                 
16 The decisions of the US Supreme Court that were especially exciting for those who defended property rights in 
“regulatory takings” cases were the following: First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los 
Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); and Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
17 A point of view that is skeptical of this possibility may be found in the work of Professor Joseph Sax (1995).  
18 See El Mercurio, Santiago, Chile, November 10, 1993, p. 3.   
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mechanism created to advance social progress. Other authors criticize the “untouchable” status 
of the current distribution of property, while they admit the existence of a general right to have 
property as a condition for human progress (Waldron, 1988; Nedelsky, 1982). A more radical 
critique argues that Constitutionalism has historically been the expression of proprietary classes’ 
fear to democracy and, thus, they assert that democracy and private property are inherently in 
conflict (McPherson, 1979).   
 Finally, there is a more pragmatic point of view that sees an incompatibility between the 
notion of regulatory takings, modern industrialized democracies, and a rising demand for 
regulation in matters such as environmental protection and labor security (Sax, 1995). These 
commentators note that if the logic of the argument for a strict protection of property rights were 
to be thoroughly pursued, it would be even possible to reach the absurd conclusion that even 
taxation is a taking in which the affected person is not compensated! (Especially in the case of 
progressive taxation.) They argue that this absurd result turns the notion of regulatory takings 
itself into an impossibility.  
 The debate on the legitimacy of regulatory takings makes evident that the adoption of a 
position on this matter necessarily involves a reflection about what private property is. 
According to Carol Rose, the incoherence of the debate on administrative takings is due to the 
fact that: 
 
“…The takings issue masks a logically prior question of some difficulty: that is, in 
order to say when governmental action ‘takes’ someone’s property, we must have 
some idea about what rights are included in property in the first place.” 19 
 
 In addition, the complexity of the problems that arise from the regulatory takings issue 
stems from the fact that while fundamental rights such as the right to free association or religious 
liberty are not related to the scarcity of resources (it is presumed that the exercise of rights such 
as freedom of religion or the right to travel is not an obstacle for the exercise of these same rights 
by others), in the case of property rights scarcity of resources has always meant that these rights 
are more restricted. The following example, taken from the American experience, may be useful 
to analyze the tensions involved in this problem.  
 In the 1970s, the US Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act in order to protect 
native wildlife. The implementation of this statute constantly requires the enactment of 
administrative orders prohibiting those uses of the land that may destroy the habitat of 
endangered species. This type of regulations may produce a sudden (and sometimes total) 
reduction of the economic value of the land owned by certain people. The affected individuals 
typically claim that they are the only ones to bear the burden of a social benefit, which, in this 
case, is the preservation of an endangered species. They add that their land is now being 
regulated precisely because it was not previously exploited and, therefore, did not play any part 
in causing the threats to the species now under protection. This—they insist with some 
bitterness—produces the paradox that in spite of not having contributed to create the problem, 
they now have to bear the entire burden of keeping alive the endangered species, which, in their 
view, is highly unfair. Those who defend the notion of regulatory takings think that what would 
be fair would be to share the cost of the protective measure between all the beneficiaries of the 
                                                 
19 See Carol Rose, “‘Takings’ and the Practices of Property: Property as Wealth, Property as ‘Propriety’,” in 
Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory, and Rhetoric of Ownership (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1994), p. 49. 
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regulation. This would be achieved by taxing every member of the community and by paying 
compensation to the affected individuals, as it happens with any regular taking. They argue that 
treating a regulatory taking in identical form to a regular taking is the only way to take property 
rights seriously.   
 The problem with this argument, however, is that even if justice issues are deemed to be 
of the highest importance in regulatory takings cases, an important number of questions will go 
unanswered. For example, is the government always obligated to compensate—based on justice 
considerations—those owners negatively affected when the regulation reduces the value of their 
assets, or when the regulations reduce the value of their private assets, or only when the impact 
of the regulations reach a threshold—say of 75% of the market value of the regulated property?  
 This brief summary of the problems implied by the notion of regulatory takings makes 
evident that this legal field is insidiously complex.  
 
VI. The Provisions of the MAI on “Regulatory Takings” 
 
 In the previous section of the essay, I noted the complexity of the problem of regulatory 
takings. The issue is so complex that the US Supreme Court hasn’t been able to come up with a 
coherent doctrine able to achieve a balance between individual justice and collective rights to 
self-determination.20 Despite this complexity, the rules of the MAI on the protection of foreign 
investors are short and clear: the OECD group adopted an extreme version of the regulatory 
takings doctrine, so radical that any of the member states has individually applied it. This section 
of the essay seeks to show the plausibility of this assertion.  
 In Chapter IV, under the “Investment Protection” Section, the paragraph “Expropriation 
and Compensation” says the following: 
 
“Art. 2.1 A Contracting Party shall not expropriate or nationalize directly or 
indirectly an investment in its territory of an investor of another Contracting 
Party or take any measure or measures having equivalent effect (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘expropriation’)21 except: 
 a) for a purpose which is in the public interest, 
 b) on a non discriminatory basis, 
 c) in accordance with due process of law, and 
d) accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation in accordance with Articles 2.2 to 2.5 below. 
 
Art. 2.2 Compensation shall be paid without delay. 
 
Art. 2.3 Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the 
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation occurred. The fair 
market value shall not reflect any change in value occurring because the 
expropriation had become publicly known earlier. 
 
Art. 2.4 Compensation shall be fully realizable and freely transferable. 
                                                 
20 Andrea Peterson—an expert in property rights—has called this field of law “the most confuse of American 
constitutional law.” See Andrea Peterson, ___.  
21 The emphasis is mine.  
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Art. 2.5 Compensation shall include interest at a commercial rate established on 
a market basis for the currency of payment from the date of expropriation until 
the date of actual payment. 
 
Art. 2.6 Due process of law includes, in particular, the right of an investor of a 
Contracting Party which claims to be affected by expropriation by another 
Contracting Party to prompt review of its case, including the valuation of its 
investment and the payment of compensation in accordance with the provisions of 
this article, by a judicial authority or another competent and independent 
authority of the latter Contracting Party.” 
 
The definition of expropriation established by the MAI in Article 2.1 was extremely 
wide, because it included “any measure or measures having equivalent effect” to expropriation. 
This is precisely the view of those who defend the notion of regulatory takings.  
 In Chapter VIII, the MAI added to the protection of foreign investment against regulatory 
takings an additional clause protecting foreign investors against “expropriatory taxation.” In 
effect, under the title “Taxation” this clause required host governments to compensate foreign 
investors whenever they were taxed with “expropriatory taxes.” The clause text was the 
following: 
 
“1. Nothing in this Agreement shall apply to taxation measures except as 
expressly provided in paragraphs 2 to 5 below. 
2. (Expropriation) shall apply to taxation measures.”  
 
The text of the MAI was accompanied by a document called “Commentary to the MAI 
Negotiating Text,” aimed at clarifying the key concepts established in the agreement. In the 
section of this document dealing with the clauses on expropriation and compensation, the 
negotiators repeated (in case there were still doubts) that these clauses covered “any measure or 
measures having equivalent effect to expropriation…” In addition, in the commentaries the 
negotiators informed that: 
 
“One delegation proposed additional text on blocking, freezing, sequestration or 
any similar measures having expropriatory effect. After discussion, it was agreed 
that these concerns were already addressed: temporary actions, when ended, 
would result in restitution of property, and, any unlawful aspects of the temporary 
measure could give rise to damages for breach of other articles, such as Article 1. 
Should the measures take on a permanent expropriatory character, they would, (i) 
if lawful, be subject to Article 2...” 
 
 In addition to these rules, the MAI negotiators agreed to extend the protection of foreign 
investment against regular and regulatory takings to investments constituted before the MAI. In 
view of the extension of the protection to the property rights of foreign investors established in 
the MAI, the drafters of the provisions on taxation were forced to add an “interpretive note” that 
reads as follows: 
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“MAI Parties understand that no taxation measures of the Parties effective at the 
time of signature of the Agreement could be considered expropriatory or having 
the equivalent effect of expropriation.”  
 
This caveat, however, was not shared by all delegations, as the Commentaries continue to 
say: “Some delegations were not in a position to associate themselves with such a statement.” 
 In this section of the essay I have quoted certain clauses of the MAI relating to the 
issue of expropriation because I think they speak for themselves. The first interesting aspect of 
these clauses is their radical treatment of the protection of the property rights of foreign 
investors. In my view, this radicalism is clear in light of the previous sections of the essay, where 
I shown the reticence of OECD states to accept the compensation for “regulatory takings” and 
the complexity of this topic.  
 The second interesting aspect of these clauses is the abrupt equivalence they draw 
between traditional, physical, taking of private property by the government and “any measure or 
measures having equivalent effect.” Any academic or lawyer in the field of American 
constitutional law, would immediately identify this language as belonging to the regulatory 
takings doctrine held by those who defend the need to compensate those who are negatively 
affected by administrative regulations.  
  The inclusion of taxation as a possible expropriatory measure equivalent to expropriation 
is also an interesting aspect of these clauses. Constitutions that include this type of rules are 
indeed very rare. In fact, I have only located something similar in the 1980 Chilean Constitution, 
which includes a prohibition against “expropriatory taxation.” 
 Finally, another interesting issue is the use of American legal jargon in the drafting of the 
MAI. This suggests that the key aspects of these clauses were drafted by American lawyers 
acquainted with the legal debate on regulatory takings in the United States.  
 In this section of the essay I have shown the radicalism of the proposals included in the 
MAI. In the following section, I will discuss the implications of this episode for the production 
of global law. 
 
VII. The Limits of Democratic Governance at a Global Scale 
 
 As I explained in the previous section, American defenders of the idea that regulatory 
takings must be compensated in the same measure that regular takings used both the judicial—
which up to now hasn’t been effective—and the legislative (through lobbying Republican 
congressmen who prepared the “Contract With America”) paths without any success. A short 
while after the failure to transform into a statute or constitutional amendment the expropriation 
clauses of the “Contract With America,” this doctrine was included in the draft of an 
international agreement of global reach—the MAI. This suggests that the same groups that tried 
to introduce these clauses into American law saw the possibility to use the international spaces of 
legislative production as an alternative way to achieve in the international context what failed at 
the domestic level.  
 In this sense, the MAI episode illustrates a set of phenomena that seem to be configuring 
the current system of legislative politics formation at a global scale: that is, the preeminent role 
of experts (evinced in the official presentation of the MAI, which underlined that it had been 
drafted by “panels of experts” of the OECD), the secret character of the deliberations that 
precede the drafting of the agreements (also evinced in the case of the MAI, insofar as the OECD 
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central offices in Paris are not even willing to disclose the names, profession, or nationality of 
the experts who participated in the drafting of the agreement),22 the possibility of existence of 
global lobbying actions, and the possible distortion of all this in the configuration of the rules 
that are definitively adopted.  
 The MAI experience also suggests that the rising tendency—predominating in modern 
democracies—of domestic legislative processes to become discussions between “experts” who 
negotiate between them in a more or less confidential fashion, without or with very scant 
participation of the public or its representatives, is adopting a more accentuated shape in 
legislative processes at a global level. We can also expect that the rise in the number of issues 
falling under the orbit of global legislation will lead domestic private interests to increasingly 
lobby the experts in charge of the production of global law. In this sense, the lack of equal access 
to lobbying that characterizes democracies at the domestic level is heightened in the case of 
global legislation.  
 These problems in the global production of law are just an additional instance of the more 
and more restricted field of democratic governance effectively exercised by the citizens, in an era 
in which we have accepted the delegation of decision-making power to central banks (in issues 
regarding the adoption of decisions related to monetary and exchange policies) and constitutional 
courts (in issues regarding the constitutional legitimacy of regular legislation). In effect, the 
compounded effect of decisions left to macroeconomists of central banks, to judges, or to the 
“experts” of international organizations, has substantially reduced the reach of what is actually 
decided by the citizenry. This leads to the paradox that it is precisely when democracy as a 
political system has developed its maximum scope—after the so-called “third wave of 
democratization” (Diamond and Linz, 1996)—the issues that, in practice, are decided by citizens 
or their representatives are fewer and fewer. Thus, while there are an increasing number of 




 The discrepancy between the domestic rules of OECD countries governing the 
compensation to be paid in expropriation cases and the provisions of the MAI shows the 
distortion caused by current practices of production of international economic law. It is worth 
highlighting, more specifically, the dangers involved in trusting the making of these norms to 
closed groups of experts acting with secrecy. 
 The MAI experience suggests that the mechanisms that are currently used in the design of 
the legal framework of economic globalization are subjected to the effects of the so-called 
“democratic deficit.” This phenomenon—which became the focus of much attention in Europe 
when the bureaucracy of the European Union was criticized for its lack of accountability—seems 
to be playing a more decisive role in the case of multilateral agreements such as the MAI. The 
democratic deficits in the production of global law might be possibly due to the fact that the 
current systems of representation at the international level are inadequate for the contexts in 
which they have to operate. In effect, although in strict terms the formal mechanisms of 
representation at the international level are still working (because once the international treaties 
and agreements are adopted the legislatures still need to ratify what was approved by the heads 
of state), it is usual that, in practice, governments (especially those of developing countries) 
present these agreements as a sort of fait accompli that cannot be repealed. This is perhaps why 
                                                 
22 I got this answer from the OECD authorities in Paris.  
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even though the classic mechanisms of political representation are still currently operating, the 
rules of the new global economy are seen more and more as the product of secret negotiations 
conducted by obscure bureaucrats who lack enough democratic legitimacy.  
 This gives rise to the question whether our current democratic institutions—designed 
more than two centuries ago—are capable to extend the citizen control that characterizes 
domestic democracies to the global production of economic rules. To be sure, the fact that classic 
and modern democratic theories were developed with the existence of autonomous nation-states 
in mind, which will occasionally join other nations via international treaties, suggests that these 
theories need to be modified in order to be able to come to terms with a scenario characterized by 
a constant discussion of multilateral agreements of high technical complexity. In sum, what this 
is all about is to try to think seriously how to structure the production of global law so that 
democratic and participatory values have a real expression in that field. If, on the contrary, we 
leave things as they now are, we might have to confront one of the following problems: a) the 
production of global economic rules might be eventually deemed to be illegitimate by the 
majority of the population of the nations affected by these rules; b) the adoption of global 
economic rules that illegitimately favors the individual interests of entities with bigger economic 
or cultural capital, or that are more akin to the “epistemic communities” (Haas, 1985) that 
actually dominate the international economic organizations participating in the production of 
global legislation; and c) the loss of time and energy of legions of diplomats, academics, and 
officials of international organizations, in cases when civil society—as it happened with the 
MAI—notices the adoption of highly controversial agreements that are very difficult to justify 
and makes them fail.  
 For these reasons, it seems to me that the MAI episode suggests that the recent calls of 
political academics such as David Held and Philippe Schmitter to begin the construction of a sort 
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